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Zimmerman: Legislation

LEGISLATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

This survey covers selected acts passed between April 1,
1972, and July 28, 1972, which are of primary importance to members of the legal profession. New and repealed statutes affecting
criminal law, workmen's compensation, contracts, and commercial transactions are discussed, but primary emphasis is placed
upon three major legislative acts. Two of these acts, one providing
for the reapportionment of the Senate of South Carolina' and the
other creating a new claim and delivery procedure,2 were enacted
in response to standards set by the United States Supreme Court.
The degree to which the acts comply with those standards will be
analyzed. The third major act deals with public access to information from governmental agencies.
IX. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

The Freedom of Information Act 3 is unprecedented legislation in South Carolina. Its ultimate impact, however, will depend
upon the judicial interpretation given to the exceptions within it.
The Act provides that all records and meetings of public agencies
shall be open and accessible to the public and empowers the
courts to grant injunctive relief to any citizen desiring to enforce
its provisions. 4 The agencies deemed "public" by the Act include
all organizations, corporations, and agencies that are supported
in whole or in part by public funds, or that expend public funds.
The Act also lists every department of state, state board, commission, authority, political subdivision, or quasi-governmental body
of the state as a public agency.5
Despite the broad scope of the Act, the extent of its actual
application is rendered uncertain by two equivocal exceptions.
Although the Act affords the public the general right to attend
all meetings of public agencies, a meeting designated an "executive session" can be closed to the public.' Moreover, while the Act
CODE ANN. § 30-4.4 (Supp. 1972).
§§ 10-2504, -2505, -2507 to -2507.5, and 43-173, -175, -181, -185 to -188.
§ 1-20.
at § 1-20.4.
§ 1-20.1.

1. S.C.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

6. Id. § 1-20.3.
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generally makes records of governmental agencies accessible, it
allows officials to withhold records when the public interest is
7
said to be best served by nondisclosure.
These exceptions raise two threshold questions: First, when
executive sessions are held, who is to provide assurance that what
has occurred should not have been open to the public? Second,
who determines whether nondisclosure of recorded information
serves the public interest?
A recent opinion of the South Carolina Attorney General was
addressed to the second question.8 According to the opinion the
agency itself should initially decide whether disclosure would
adversely affect the public interest. If an exception is taken to
this decision, the agency must satisfy a court in an injunctive
proceeding authorized by the Act that nondisclosure benefits the
public. Following a similar procedure to determine when an
agency can properly meet in executive session would seem to be
a viable approach consistent with the intent and spirit of the Act.9
III.

REAPPORTIONMENT

In 1972 the General Assembly passed two different plans to
reapportion the Senate of South Carolina."0 The reasons for two
disparate plans within one act are evident in light of the facts
precipitating its passage.
The 1971 reconvened session of the General Assembly passed
an act including a plan for the reapportionment of the State
Senate." Because of the approaching 1972 general election, the
Senate directed the Attorney General to institute an action to
determine the validity of the reapportionment plan." As a result
13
of this action, a three judge federal court in Twiggs v. West
declared the plan invalid under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment 4 and granted the General Assembly
thirty days to enact a plan within guidelines specified by the
court.
7. Id. § 1-20.1.
8. [1972] S.C. REP. Ar'r'y GEN. 187 (No. 3348).
9. See No. 1396, § 2, [1972] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2585.
10. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 30-4.4 (Supp. 1972).
11. No. 932, [1971] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2071.
12. No. 1205, § 1(5), [19721 S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2384.
13. Twiggs v. West, Civil No. 71-1106 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 1972).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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The demise of the 1971 reapportionment plan can be traced
to several United States Supreme Court decisions. In Reynolds v.
Sims" the Court stated that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with
other citizens in the jurisdiction. In more recent decisions 6 the
Court has qualified Reynolds by acknowledging that rational
state policies may be served by allowing substantially less than
equal representation. The Court also considers a state's good
faith, or lack thereof, in attempting to comply with the one man,
one vote requirement within the framework of its policy objectives. These factors are then .balanced against the extent of a
reapportionment plan's total variance' 7 from mathematically
equal representation.
This balancing test was applied in Abate v. Mundt,5 where
the Supreme Court gave effect to a state policy maintaining the
integrity of political subdivisions and thereby permitted a maximum variance of 11.9 percent. In Wells v. Rockefeller," however,
maintenance of existing county lines was held to be insufficient
justification for a congressional reapportionment that resulted in
a 12.1 percent variance. Mr. Justice White, dissenting in Wells
and Kirkpatrick v. Preisler," stated that as a general rule a total
variance between the largest and smallest district of no more than
10 to 15 percent should be satisfactory.
Relying on these decisions, the court in Twiggs held that
South Carolina's purported policy of maintaining then existing
senatorial districts as a deterrent to gerrymandering could not
justify a total variance of 19 to 24 percent. This decision is reinforced by Mahan v. Howell,2 ' in which the Supreme Court recently stated that a total variance of 16 percent may approach
acceptable limits. Mahan also stressed the distinction between
congressional redistricting and state legislative reapportionment:
15. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
16. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969);
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
17. Total variance is computed by dividing the number of legislators into the total
population, thereby finding the average number of individuals each legislator should
represent. The degree of deviation from this norm of the most overrepresented district is
then added to the deviation from the norm of the most underrepresented district. The
resulting number is the reapportionment plan's total variance.
18. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
19. 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
20. 394 U.S. 526, 553 (1969).
21. 93 S.Ct. 979 (1973).
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A state objective of preserving the integrity of political subdivisions is of greater force in a state legislative reapportionment
because it furthers the legislative purpose of facilitating enactment of statutes of purely local concern and thus preserves for
voters in political subdivisions a voice in the state legislature on
local matters. As a result, when a good faith attempt to redistrict
is found in a state legislative reapportionment, greater flexibility
in total variance will be permitted than in a congressional redistricting. Nevertheless, South Carolina's 1971 plan clearly exceeded the limits set forth in Mahan.
In response to the Twiggs decision, the South Carolina Senate adopted the present plan with a total variance of 9.93 percent,
and the House of Representatives amended the plan and submitted another with a potential variance of 9.3 to 12.37 percent. A
conference committee failed to agree on either plan, and, rather
than default in the matter, the General Assembly enacted both
plans with the expectation that the federal court would find that
one complied with its guidelines. 22 The plan that originated in the
Senate was accepted, 23 and the general election of 1972 was con-

ducted in accordance with it.*
22. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4.4 (Supp. 1972).

23. Twiggs v. West, Civil No. 71-1123 (D.S.C. May 23, 1972). In Twiggs v. West, Civil
No. 71-1211 (D.S.C. Jun. 9, 1972), the court refused to vacate its May 23, 1972, decision
approving the Senate plan. This decision was appealed to the United States Supreme
Court on the grounds that it was a denial of due process to approve the plan without
hearing any argument. The Supreme Court has since affirmed the June 9, 1972 district
court order. Powell v. West, 41 U.S.L.W. 3671 (U.S. June 25, 1973) (No. 72-452).
*[Editor'sNote: The validity of the Senate reapportionment plan was, of course,
clouded by Harper v. Richardson, Civil No. 1607-72 (D.D.C. 1973). In Harperthe United
Citizens Party sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia and compelled the
Department of Justice to interpose an official objection to the plan pursuant to section 5
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970). Although the Department had
made a specific finding that the plan discriminated against blacks, it felt constrained to
defer to the decision of the three judge panel upholding the plan in Twiggs v. West, Civil
Nos. 71-1106, 71-1123, 71-1211 (D.S.C. 1972). The district court in Harper, however,
apparently reasoned that the plan's constitutional validity under the Reynolds doctrine
was not dispositive of its validity under the Voting Rights Act. The court held that the
Department's allowing the statutory period for objecting to elapse did not constitute
approval of the plan because section 5 imposes on the Department an affirmative duty to
object that cannot be ignored. The Department has appealed.
It should also be noted that the House reapportionment was declared invalid by the
United States Supreme Court in Stevenson v. West, 41 U.S.L.W. 3671 (U.S. June 25,
1973). This decision is discussed in the 1973 Survey of South CarolinaLegislation, 25
S.C.L. REV. - (1973), which will be published in October.]
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IV.

CONTRACTS

Several significant new statutes concern the contractual assent of a minor. One provision grants a minor over the age of
sixteen the authority to consent to all health services except those
involving operations that might jeopardize his life.2 4 This law
makes the further consent of an adult unnecessary. Moreover,
consent given by a minor for health services isnot subject to
2
disavowal because of infancy after the minor reaches legal age. 1
A recent opinion of the South Carolina Attorney General
interpreting this statute addressed itself to the question of
whether a minor sixteen years or older may procure birth control
pills without the consent of her parents 2.6 The opinion stated that
"health services" as used in the statute include those services
reasonably associated with the preservation, maintenance, or restoration of psychological and physical well being. Birth control
pills, apart from their primary use, serve to regulate body functions and reduce physical pain. Dispensation of the pills is therefore a "health service" that may be sought by minors without
parental permission.
A statute that severely restricted a minor's power to contract
in South Carolina was repealed.2 This law had rendered null and
void any contract for the purchase of merchandise or articles of
trade entered into by a minor college undergraduate. The minor
was not even allowed to confirm the contract when he reached
legal age. The repeal of this statute will obviously increase the
credit available to students.
V.

CRIMINAL LAW

An interesting change in the state's criminal law is the
amendment to section 16-383.2 of the South Carolina Code. Before amendment the statute classified as a misdemeanor the communication of a threat to damage any public building or private
residence with explosives. 28 The amendment to the statute
changed the commission of this act to a felony, and also classified
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-565 (Supp. 1972).
Id. § 32-568.
[1972] S.C. REP. ATr'Y GEN. 213 (No. 3364).
No. 1298, [1972] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2487.
No. 651, [1960] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1602.
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as a felony the act of communicating a threat to kill or intimidate.20
The conduct this statute punishes as a felony is the mere
verbalizing of an inchoate intent to commit a crime. Thus the
statute departs from the common law principle that a threat to
commit a crime is not a crime and that violence must actually
be offered before an individual can be subjected to punishment."
The basis of this principle is that a threat of future violence is not
a battery. Nor is it an assault, for such a threat is neither an
attempt to commit a battery nor an act of placing another in
apprehension of receiving an immediate battery. Thus, by departing from the common law in an effort to deter a disruptive
form of conduct, the General Assembly has authorized the imposition of criminal sanctions upon an individual prior to the time
he may actually decide to commit a crime.
Among the anachronistic and unconstitutional criminal laws
that have been repealed are two that concern marriage. Members
of the Caucasion race may now marry members of the Indian or
Negro races without transgressing South Carolina law.12 Secondly, individuals performing such a ceremony are no longer subject to criminal prosecution. 3
Important regulatory legislation enacted in 1972 is the Polygraph Examiners Act. 34 The purpose of the Act is to establish
standards for all persons who profess to be skilled in using instruments to detect deception or verify statements. The Act not only
requires that individuals administering the polygraph be licensed
but also establishes minimum specifications for the instruments
that may be used.
VI.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

In 1972 the General Assembly enacted a provision enlarging
the number of employers to whom the South Carolina Workmen's
Compensation Law35 applies. Formerly, an employer having less
29.
30.
31.
32.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-383.2 (Supp. 1972).
R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 132 (2d ed. 1969).
Id.
No. 1198, [1972] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2378, repealing No. 5, [1879] S.C. Acts

3.
33. No. 1199, [1972] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2379, repealing No. 5, [1879] S.C. Acts

3.

34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1543.51 (Supp. 1972).
35. Id, §§ 72-1 to -504 (1962), as amended.
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than fifteen employees did not come within the Law." Now the
Law applies to any employer who has six or more regular employees, 37 and thus affords benefits to many more workers.
Other revisions extend workmen's compensation coverage to
inmates of the South Carolina Department of Corrections who
participate in vocational training programs 3 and increase the
monetary benefits for totally or partially disabled employees.3 9 A
further change augments an individual's maximum compensation substantially from $12,500 to $25,000.1o
VII.

CLAIM AND DELIVERY

One of the most controversial areas of the law today concerns
the respective rights of a secured party" and a debtor after the
debtor's default on a conditional or installment sales agreement.
Section 10.9-503 of the South Carolina Code 2 gives the secured
party the immediate right to collateral in the defaulting debtor's
possession. This "self-help" remedy is available without judicial
process provided the secured party can recover the collateral
43
without breaching the peace.

The secured party can also elect to pursue his right to acquire
the collateral through the claim and delivery procedure.4 The
36. No. 201, [1936] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1231.
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-107(2) (Supp. 1972).
38. Id. § 72-11.1 (Supp. 1972).
39. Id. §§ 72-151, -152.
40. Id. § 72-160.
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-105(i) (Spec. Supp. 1966) defines a secured party as a
lender, seller, or other person in whose favor there is a security interest. Section 10.1201(37) states that a security interest is an interest in personal property or fixtures which
secures payment or performance of an obligation. The retention or reservation of title by
a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer is limited in effect to
a reservation of a security interest.
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.9-503 (Spec. Supp. 1966).
43. Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 324 F. Supp. 108 (D.S.C. 1971). The constitutionality of a secured party's immediate right to possession of the collateral was attacked in Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The court in Oiler
held that a private act taken by a private organization to protect its security interest in
personal property was not "state action" that would result in a deprivation of property
without due process of law. In direct conflict with Oiler is the holding in Adams v. Egley,
338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972). Adams stated that the self-help remedy, even if created
by a signed security agreement, is a right created under the authority of state law, and
use of the remedy constitutes state action violating due process. The United States Supreme Court has not yet rendered a decision on the constitutionality of the self help
remedy.
44. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2504, -2505, -2507 to -2507.5, and 43-173, -175, -181, -185
to -188 (Supp. 1972).
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state's former procedure45 accorded the secured party, upon
swearing out an affidavit and posting bond, the right to immediate possession of the collateral. The county sheriff was authorized
to seize collateral in the debtor's possession without affording him
prior notice or an opportunity to be heard. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 8
however, the United States Supreme Court held similar state
prejudgment replevin statutes invalid under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment." Procedural due process
requires an opportunity for a hearing before the state authorizes
its agents, upon the mere application of another, to seize property
in the possession of a debtor. "[W]hen a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own defense, and when the State must listen
to what he has to say, substantively unfair and simply mistaken
'4 8
deprivations of property interests can be prevented.
In attempting to meet the requirements of Fuentes, the General Assembly completely revised the state's claim and delivery
procedure. 9 A major provision in the new statutes permits the
defaulting debtor to demand a pre-seizure hearing within five
days after service of the secured party's affidavit. 0 However, the
right to a pre-seizure hearing is not absolute for the secured party
and the debtor may provide in their contract for a waiver of the
hearing. 1 Furthermore, if the secured party satisfies a magistrate
upon his ex parte affidavit that the property secured is in immediate danger of being concealed or destroyed, the magistrate can
2
order the property seized without prior notice to the debtor.
Whether these statutes comply with the Supreme Court's
standards is uncertain. Fuentes indicates that a prejudgment replevin statute may be upheld if it serves important governmental
or public interests. 53 Permitting a secured party to repossess collateral in immediate danger of destruction or concealment could
conceivably be such an interest. To be valid, however, replevin
statutes must be narrowly drawn, providing specifically for the
45. Id. §§ 10-2501 to -2516 (1962).
46. 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (1972). See also Survey of S.C. Constitutional Law

infra.
47.
48.
49.
50.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
92 S.Ct. at 1994.
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2504, -2505, -2507 to -2507.5 (Supp. 1972).
Id. § 10-2504.

51. Id. § 10-2507.2.
52. Id. § 10-2507.4.
53. 92 S.Ct. at 2000.
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existence of unusual conditions prior to seizure without notice.54
The South Carolina statutes also may conflict with Fuentes
because they place the burden of requesting a hearing on the
debtor instead of requiring that a hearing be held. Moreover, the
statutes limit the time during which the debtor may assert his
constitutional right to five days.5
Finally, the new claim and delivery statutes are vulnerable
because they allow a contract to include a provision waiving the
debtor's right to a pre-seizure hearing. 6 To enforce a waiver and
obtain the right to immediate possession of the property, the
creditor need only present the waiver provision to a judge or clerk
of court. Because no hearing is held, the debtor has no opportunity to assert that the waiver was involuntary or even that his
signature was forged. Overmyer v. Frick, cited in Fuentes,
outlines the relevant considerations in determining whether there
has been a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver of due process rights.57 Important factors are equal bargaining power and
the receipt of something in return for the waiver-two conditions
not often present in consumer transactions. Thus, section 102507.2 of the Code" purports to allow a secured party to simply
revise his conditional sales contracts to include a standardized
waiver provision and thereby avoid a hearing. The General Assembly apparently has advanced the concept of freedom of contract at the expense of the consumer's right to procedural due
process.
MICHAEL A. ZIMMERMAN
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2504 (Supp. 1972).
Id. § 10-2507.2.
92 S.Ct. at 2001.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2507.2 (Supp. 1972).
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